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Abstract 
While modernist planning theory reifies knowledge as an object and makes it an 
inherent part of modernism’s legitimacy, postmodern planning theory celebrates 
multiple epistemologies but fails to specify institutional arrangements for handling 
multiple knowledges in a way that recognises the specificity of knowledge claims. An 
argument is made here for the limited variety of forms that such knowledge claims 
can take and the need to create spaces within planning processes for testing and 
recognising these different knowledge claims. 
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Re-examining the Role of Knowledge within Planning Theory 
 
 
Introduction 
There has been a significant shift in the conceptualisation of the category of 
‘knowledge’ within the social sciences over recent decades. Latour discusses this in 
terms of the breakdown of the modernist consensus (1999). This consensus had seen 
the Enlightenment dilemma of a dualism of nature and society resolved by knowledge 
providing a mirror onto ‘nature’ for ‘society’. Knowledge was an entity, to be held 
and used. It was produced by experts in distinct institutions through processes that 
ensured its objectivity. The breakdown of this consensus involved recognising that 
knowledge is constructed through social processes and that the institutions that 
generate knowledge will not necessarily ensure neutrality (Irwin, 1995). More 
generally, it involved seeing knowledge not as an object but as embedded in sets of 
social relations (Wynne, 2002). Knowledge is therefore generated in knowledge 
networks encompassing sets of relevant linkages. In policy contexts, bounded 
networks such as epistemic communities (Haas 2001, 2004) or communities of 
practice (Wenger, 1998) operate to construct knowledge in processes that involve 
scientific experts and practitioners. 
 
This shift has implications for the social process of planning. As Sandercock explains, 
planning as an activity has its roots in a modernist conception of society (1998). As 
such, it has been based on a belief in planners’ ability to manage events in pursuit of 
the greater public good. The use of knowledge is a central element in achieving 
change through planning. Indeed the very rationale for planning within modernism is   3 
that knowledge can be harnessed through planning to achieve positive change. The 
notion of progress is inherent to modernism so that as knowledge accretes over time, 
societal improvement follows from the use of more and better knowledge through 
planning.  Planning practice has, therefore, seen itself as a user of knowledge in the 
pursuit of progress. The status of planners as experts resides in their command of 
specialist knowledge.  
 
The critique of modernist planning offered by contemporary planning theory raises 
key issues for how knowledge should be conceptualised within the planning process 
and how, institutionally, arrangements should be put into place for handling 
knowledge within that process. This is the focus of this paper – the institutional 
arrangements concerning knowledge within planning processes. The paper begins by 
briefly reviewing the emphasis within both the planning theory and sociology of 
scientific knowledge literatures on multiple knowledges. It argues that the conclusions 
of these literatures, on the use of deliberative processes as a way of handling multiple 
knowledges, are inadequate. Instead the paper argues for a pragmatic approach to 
knowledge, which focuses on creating arenas for the testing and recognition of 
knowledge claims within planning processes. It discusses the importance of testing 
knowledge claims and briefly sets this in the context of Habermas’ discussion of 
validity claims and communicative action. Finally, it presents a heuristic typology of 
knowledge claims within planning and discusses the institutional arrangements 
involved in claim testing and recognition using three planning examples. These 
examples demonstrate the importance of the explicit consideration of knowledge in a 
post-modern planning era.  
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Before proceeding, it is useful to define terms. Knowledge differs from information 
and data in that the specification of a causal relationship is central to knowledge. This 
is why knowledge is of such central relevance to planning. Since planning seeks to 
create specific impacts, planners need to understand how such impacts follow from 
specific planning actions; they need to understand the causal relationships between 
action and impact. Causal relationships may be implicit in the presentation of a 
particular dataset or type of information, but in that case it is the knowledge that 
supports the use of that data or information that is important. This paper argues for the 
more explicit recognition that knowledge of such causal relationships is an important 
part of planning practice and then works through the institutional implications of such 
a recognition. 
 
 
From knowledge to knowledges 
One of the implications of the breakdown in the modernist consensus on knowledge 
has been the call from the sociological literature on science, the policy literature on 
environmental issues and the planning theory literature that knowledge can no longer 
be considered as a unified category (Evans and Marvin, 2006). Knowledge is 
inherently multiple, with multiple claims to representing reality and multiple ways of 
knowing (Sandercock, 1998). This is in contrast to the positivist claim of modernism 
that examination of the facts will reveal the truth. Closely associated with this insight 
is the argument that knowledge is not just the domain of the expert – whether a 
scientist or a planner – but rather is associated with a variety of actors in a variety of 
social locations. Knowledge now has a variety of sources and takes a variety of 
different forms.    5 
 
Within science studies, there has been an emphasis on exploring how scientific 
knowledge needs to engage with lay knowledges (Wynne,1996). The environmental 
domain has particularly demonstrated the benefits of engaging with local people, who 
live and work in close relationship with their physical environment (such as agrarian 
communities) and have developed knowledge of that environment through their 
everyday experience. This is local, experiential and contextualised knowledge, as 
compared to the non-local, objectified and generalised knowledge of scientific 
institutions. While some have argued against the automatic prioritisation of local over 
scientific knowledge (Forsyth, 2002), it is now generally accepted that the knowledge 
embedded in local relationships needs to be drawn upon in local policy practice, to 
guide the contextualisation of conventional scientific knowledge. This can be 
distinguished from more general calls for the involvement of the public in debating 
scientific issues and their public policy applications, where the aim is to engage 
scientific communities with social values and thereby engender greater public 
acceptance of and trust in particular policy approaches (Owens, 2000). 
 
A parallel trend can be seen within planning theory. As readers of this journal well 
know, planning theory has been on a journey over the last half-century from the 
exposition of an essentially modernist conception of planning - perhaps reaching its 
peak in the systems theory of the 1970s - to a more fragmented theoretical field 
(Allmendinger, 2001, 2002). Within this current theoretical fragmentation there are 
signs of a new orthodoxy emerging. This new orthodoxy clusters around the idea that 
the core of planning should be an engagement with a range of stakeholders, giving 
them voice and seeking to achieve a planning consensus. For theorists and   6 
practitioners of consensus building, this consensus has to be won through negotiation 
and mediation between interests (Innes, 2004); for collaborative planning theorists 
(Healey, 1997), consensus is potentially inherent in the act of communication between 
stakeholders; for radical planners (Sandercock, 1998), the aim is not consensus at any 
price but empowerment of the most disadvantaged and unheard within society.  
 
What is of interest to the theme of this paper is the view of knowledge implied in this 
new orthodoxy. The shift from the modernist model challenges the notion of the 
planner as the knower, the holder of knowledge (Sandercock 1998, p. 88). Instead, 
contemporary planning theory – in line with contemporary science studies – puts 
considerable emphasis on knowledge being held outside the planning organisation and 
by groups other than professionally trained planners. Sandercock herself calls for ‘an 
epistemology of multiplicity’ (op. cit. p. 76) encompassing the following ways of 
knowing: through dialogue; from experience; from local knowledge; by learning to 
read symbolic and non-verbal evidence; and through contemplative or appreciative 
knowledge. In this vision, planning is transformed by seeking knowledges in new 
forms and having a heterogeneous knowledge base for its actions.  
 
But more than this, the purpose of planning is to handle multiple knowledges. The 
emphasis is on listening to unheard voices and hence previously unheard knowledges 
variously categorised as lay, local, experiential or intuitive. The difficulty that this 
poses for planning is how to handle the multiple sources of knowledge, how to engage 
different knowledges with each other and how to change decision making as a result. 
The answer that has emerged – again from sociology of science, environmental policy 
and planning theory literatures – is a greater reliance on deliberative and collaborative   7 
approaches. But there are a number of concerns with this reliance on deliberation and 
collaboration. 
 
 
Knowledge and the limits to deliberation and collaboration  
Some concerns are general to the use of deliberative and collaborative processes 
within planning. These have been well-rehearsed (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 
1998; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Rydin, 2003a) and can be summarised as: a lack of specificity 
as to how the theory of these processes should put into practice; doubts as to the 
abilities of planners to undertake such processes successfully; the potential for 
powerful interests to subvert the processes; and the inability of such processes to 
handle conflicts of interests and generate a consensus or agreement in the face of such 
conflicts. However, there are specific concerns regarding the use of such processes to 
handle multiple knowledges (see also Petts and Brooks, 2006). After all, such 
processes are usually promoted on the basis of exploring the values of local 
communities and generating trust between parties. The orientation towards reaching 
agreement (if not actual consensus) may not be best-suited to ensuring that the most 
appropriate knowledge influences decision-making. There are two aspects to this: 
whether such processes can handle multiple knowledges; and whether they are able to 
distinguish knowledge from other bases for involvement.  
 
Handling multiple knowledges involves more than just bringing the different actors 
together to articulate those knowledges in a context oriented towards mutual 
understanding. Just as with other heterogeneous voices, the engagement between 
multiple knowledges – particularly lay and expert knowledges – involves translation.   8 
But, as Evans and Marvin (2006) warn us, knowledges are not additive and so 
reducing them to a lingua franca will not of itself enable a resolution to that 
engagement. It is much more difficult than often acknowledged to generate agreement 
between actors whose knowledge of an issue is rooted in very different experiences. 
In a recent clarification of one version of the collaborative paradigm, Innes points out 
that consensus building does not proceed through the force of better argument but 
rather by collective story telling (2004). She identifies two rather different conditions 
in which consensus building can make a positive contribution: on the one hand, 
accessible and fully shared information is cited as one of a set of preconditions for 
this approach (p. 7); on the other, it is seen as appropriate in conditions where 
‘uncertainty is rampant’ (p. 16). In both cases, the emphasis falls on values and 
understandings, either because there is no dispute over knowledge or there is no 
certain knowledge. However most planning situations fall between these extremes. 
 
It is therefore necessary to acknowledge that engaging different knowledges is 
fundamentally different to engaging different voices. To explore this, it is helpful to 
recast knowledge as knowledge claims, i.e. a claim to understanding certain causal 
relationships. A variety of claims are asserted within planning processes, but a 
knowledge claim can be distinguished from an ethical, pragmatic, efficiency or 
aesthetic claim, say. All such claims are important within a planning process; but they 
are different from each other. As Collins and Evan say, in an important exchange in 
science studies, stakeholder rights are conceptually different from rights based on 
expertise (2002, p.250; see also Jasanoff, Rip and Wynne, 2003). This is a point that 
Habermas argued through his tripartite structure of speech acts in terms of validity 
claims: claims to truth, normative legitimacy and truthfulness. These are constituted   9 
in the form of constatives, regulatives and expressives respectively in his terminology 
and are seen as distinct aspects of speech acts (1987, p. 121; Niemi, 2005).  
 
Planning processes therefore need to be able to distinguish knowledge claims put 
forward by actors from the other kinds of claims that actors may make. This is not to 
say that the knowledge claims are more important than, say, the ethical claims but 
rather they are fundamentally different. This point has been somewhat obscured 
within contemporary planning theory for two reasons. First, there has been an 
emphasis on values and how to generate a social agreement from a mix of different 
values. There are values implicit in knowledge claims but knowledge cannot be 
reduced only to the associated values. Second, there has been a tendency to label all 
the claims of local communities in particular as forms of knowledge (see Sandercock, 
1998). Given the emancipatory message in much planning theory, there is a political 
rationale in describing the claims of civil society stakeholders in this way; talking of 
such actors as having knowledge raises their status within the planning process. The 
experience of local stakeholders may be an important basis for claiming local or 
experiential knowledge but, as Collins and Evans point out, such experience is not of 
itself a sufficient condition for it to be knowledge (2002, p. 251; see also Rip, 2003, p. 
424).   
 
A few examples may clarify this point. In the case of an environmental risk, a 
distinction is often drawn between expert quantitative and/or probabilistic assessment 
of risk and a local communities’ attitude to that risk. Accredited experts can present 
the latter as exaggerated and based on insufficient information or understanding. 
Proponents of a more participatory approach, however, have argued that the   10 
communities’ perspective is as relevant as an experiential account of that risk. In 
some cases, that experience (for example, of local ill-health episodes) may form the 
basis for challenging prevailing expert assessments. But that does not mean that all 
community perceptions of environmental risk are knowledge. Turning to issues of 
cultural heritage, local communities may have historic knowledge about their locality 
that could contribute to planning practice. The community probably also have an 
emotional attachment to the locality and further political claims based in their 
historical stake in the area. Their knowledge claims may be important in generalising 
the community’s overall claims to direct the future of their area but they are distinct 
from the emotional and historic claims. Finally, a socially disadvantaged community 
can provide rich knowledge about their lived experience that could highlight 
previously overlooked problems of poverty. This knowledge could shape the details 
of regeneration strategies. Such communities also have a powerful ethical claim to 
influence local planning but the ethical and knowledge claims are not coincident.  
 
 
Planners as co-producers of knowledge 
Highlighting the role of planning institutions in relation to knowledge claims also 
means that role of the planning system in co-producing knowledge can be 
acknowledged (Jasanoff, 1990). This is in line with the argument for the emergence of 
a new mode (Mode 2) of knowledge production in which practitioners and users are 
actively involved in the production of knowledge (Gibbons, et al., 1994). This co-
production work is of two kinds. First, following through on the insights of 
contemporary planning theory, there is the work of giving voice to the various actors 
who have a knowledge claim relevant to the issue at hand; in doing so, planners need   11 
to recognise the position of more and less powerful actors. But, taking the argument 
beyond this body of theory, planners can also be actively involved in recognising 
some of these claims as knowledge claims relevant to planning practice, and this 
involves some degree of testing of the claims. In the debates within science studies, a 
renewed emphasis on the testing of different knowledge claims has been seen as key 
to reconciling the insights of lay and expert knowledges. 
 
Liberatiore and Funtowicz argue: 
Expertise is not found but made in the process of litigation, decision-making 
and public debate; at the same time, not all knowledge claims are to be treated 
as equal. Expertise has legitimacy when it is exercised in ways that make 
visible its contingent, negotiated character and other critical views are 
accepted. (2003, p. 149, my emphasis) 
In the debate on Collins and Evan’s paper, Rip refers to the need for ‘assessing the 
robustness of the knowledge being produced’ (2003, p. 422); Nowotny sets out some 
criteria for ‘socially robust knowledge’: tested for validity, involving an extended 
group of experts, and repeatedly tested, expanded and modified (2003, p. 155). 
Jasanoff sees a key purpose of more participatory processes to test expertise and hold 
it to ‘cultural standards for reliable public knowledge’ (2003, p. 397-8).  
 
Rather than being at odds with the Habermasian roots of collaborative planning 
theory, there are strong connections since Habermas sees the illocutionary acts of 
speech as necessarily involving validity claims if they are to constitute 
communicative action:   12 
‘Not all illocutionary acts are constitutive for communicative action, but only 
those with which speakers connect criticisable validity claims’ (Habermas, 
1984, p. 305). 
His argument is that consensus through communication depends on the speaker being 
able to convince her listener(s) that the claims are rational and thus worthy of 
recognition (White, 1988, p. 28). Rationality here involves justifying the claims with 
reference to the appropriate criteria. In the case of constatives the reference point is 
factual material, for regulatives established norms and for expressives authenticity.  
 
The mutual expectation of those engaged in communicative action is that a validity 
claim can, if challenged, be defended and this creates a ‘binding force’ between actors 
(ibid, p. 34). Thus a speech act needs to be mutually understandable (the point that has 
been most emphasised within planning theory) but also warranted, i.e. seen as capable 
of rational defence (ibid, p. 41). White (1988, p. 42) argues that Habermas overstates 
this point and that ‘in pluralist societies, hearers can understand symbolic expressions 
without taking a stance on its validity’. But even if this is true for general social 
interaction, in a planning context, the requirements of rationality would approach 
Habermas’ expectations and that actors are less likely (and should be less likely) 
willingly to accept validity claims on an unwarranted basis. The interesting point to 
take from Habermas is that testing of validity claims is seen as an intuitive skill of 
competent speakers and thus available within communicative arenas. Ironically this 
intuitive skill is itself a result of the historic conditions of modernity.  
 
This suggests that the planning system should be conceptualised as a series of arenas 
in which a variety of  knowledges engage with each other, with planners not just   13 
responsible for procedural aspects of the engagement but more actively involved in 
the co-generation of knowledge through testing and recognising knowledge claims. 
There needs to be space for giving voice to these various claims– opening-up – but 
also for testing and ultimately recognising these claims– closing- down. 
Contemporary planning theory has tended to be better at discussing opening-up than 
closing-down. However, if it is recognised that there is a difference between a 
knowledge claim that stands up to close examination and challenge and one that does 
not (Collins and Evans, 2002), then there is scope for discussing closing-down. This 
fits with developments in science studies that see knowledge as both socially 
constructed and the result of an engagement with material reality (Latour, 1999); this 
has been variously termed co-construction  (Murdoch, 2001), heterogeneous 
constructionism (Demeritt, 2001) or realist constructivism (Wynne, 2002). 
 
Making spaces within the planning system for debating and testing knowledge claims 
may involve supporting some actors who do not have the resources to engage in such 
debates otherwise (see Reardon, 2003 for a very telling example); it will involve 
understanding that knowledge claims can be expressed in different languages so that 
accredited expertise is not privileged because it is assumed to talk the language of 
knowledge. In this, shifting the focus towards knowledge claims still retains the 
lessons of collaborative or radical planning theory. But it is patronising to assume that 
knowledge debates cannot be ventured openly in a variety of languages and that lay 
discourses must necessarily be limited to experiential stories or emotional realms 
which are somehow knowledge-free or can only be seen as knowledge by expanding 
the knowledge category; (Collins and Evans refer to this as the ‘Problem of 
Extension’, 2002).   14 
 
How planning performs this recognition function depends on the kind of knowledge at 
issue. To explore this further, it is helpful to have a framework for identifying the 
different kinds of knowledge claims that planners are faced with. The institutional 
arrangements for responding to these claims can then be specified more fully. This 
approach is developed below through a typology of knowledge claims and illustrated 
with three planning policy examples. 
 
A typology of knowledge claims within planning 
While there are always simplifications and limitations involved in the use of 
typologies, there are also benefits of clarification. So this section proposes to address 
the question of how to understand the different kinds of knowledge claims by 
developing such a typology (Collins and Evans, 2002). The case made here starts 
from a generic concept of planning, one with an acknowledged normative focus based 
in the desire to achieve an improved natural and built environment for society. 
Beyond this the model does not seek to specify a planning approach more tightly.  
 
Insert Figure 1 and Table 2 near here 
 
Figure 1 sets out the starting point for the discussion. In Figure 1, planning 
seeks to turn State A into State B
1. In the absence of planning, then societal, economic 
and environmental processes would result in a transformation of State A to State B. 
This does not mean that planning is somehow seen as outside of such societal, 
economic and environmental processes; on the contrary, it is clearly constituted by 
such processes. However, the discussion seeks to identify the particular contribution   15 
that a planning process is trying to make. Neither does this admittedly simple 
formulation seek to deny the complexity of society and of planning’s engagement 
with that complexity. Rather it seeks to capture the essence of what a planning action 
is trying to achieve and this is a change in the nature of the physical (natural and built) 
environment.  
  However, planning outcomes may well differ from stated planning intentions. 
Contemporary planning commentators and practitioners no longer take it for granted 
that they will end up where they say they are going; B
1 can be an elusive goal. 
Nevertheless the intervention of planning has some effect, even if not the stated one. 
Some have argued that the impact of planning is a purely symbolic one, with no real 
effect on the physical environment (Ball 1983, Ambrose 1986). But these views are 
overwhelmed by research on the impact that planning does have, highly critical 
though much of this research is (see Rydin 2003b, Ch.14 and Ward 2004, Ch. 10 for a 
review of such research). So Figure 1 also identifies State B
2 as the state resulting 
from the intervention of planning. If B is the anticipated housing shortage and B
1 is 
the planned matching of housing supply and housing need, then B
2 is the combination 
of profitable housing developments with continuing over-crowdedness, housing stress 
and homelessness. 
  The value of Figure 1 lies in the categorisation it offers of the different ways 
that knowledge claims could be relevant to the planning process: 
1.  Knowledge of the current State A can act as a benchmark against 
which a preferable State B
1 can be measured. 
2.  Knowledge of the predicted State B represents a refinement of the first 
kind of knowledge, recognising that society is not static but moving   16 
towards new patterns, so that desired planned state B
1 must be judged 
against State B, not A. Such knowledge of State B requires, in turn … 
3.  Knowledge of the social, economic and environmental processes that 
will move us from State A to B. 
4.  Given the knowledge about a desired State B
1, this implies a need for 
further process knowledge, that linking State A to State B
1. This is 
knowledge of the planning process itself and how it could work to 
achieve desired ends. However, in keeping with the recognition that 
planning practice does not (always) achieve these ends, two further 
types of knowledge can be identified … 
5.  Knowledge of the actual outcomes of planning processes in their 
societal context, i.e. of State B
2 and … 
6.  Process knowledge of how State A was turned into State B
2. 
This suggests, therefore, six different types of knowledge: two broadly empirical and 
descriptive, one predictive, and three process-oriented.  
  However, there is also a kind of knowledge involved in specifying the goal of 
planning. In this model, the goal of planning is desired State B
1 and the specification 
of this itself requires a form of knowledge, knowledge of possible futures. But this 
kind of knowledge is different from both the more empirical and process knowledges 
outlined above. Knowledge of desired states is explicitly normative in character; 
indeed its normative character defines the type of knowledge. Hence this type of 
knowledge could be called normative. This is not to deny that empirical descriptions 
and analyses of processes are both inherently value-laden. The choice of descriptors 
of a state and the emphasis on certain causal dynamics carry with them value 
judgements. But the desired state is prioritised as normative. It is not exclusively   17 
normative though – and it is here that its character as a form of knowledge lies – since 
not any imaginings will serve as a planning goal. There has to be an engagement with 
possible realities and therefore this form of knowledge is both explicitly normative 
and yet still based in claims about possible paths. So the following can be added to the 
list:  
7.  Normative knowledge of State B
1 
Each of these knowledge types plays a distinctive role within planning and 
each has rather different characteristics (see Table 1 for the application of this 
typology). But despite the differences between these types of knowledge claims, there 
are common features. First, none of these knowledges can be considered value-free. 
In each case there are value judgements involved in the framing of the knowledge, the 
decision as to what is the object of knowledge. In descriptive knowledge, something 
specific has to be described and that selection is value-laden. It makes a difference if 
market prices or child poverty is used to describe the affluence of an area. Second, 
each knowledge category is not only reflective of values but also carries with it a 
related causal story. This may be more implicit (as with many statements of 
descriptive knowledge) or acknowledged explicitly (as with some statements of 
predictive or process knowledge) but all knowledge has a causal story embedded 
within it.  
 
 
Testing and recognising knowledge claims within planning 
The challenge this poses to planning practitioners is to create arenas to engage, test 
and recognise these different knowledge claims. Rip talks of ‘hybrid forums’ for 
‘agonistic, collective learning’ and sees the important next step as being ‘to look into   18 
the (emerging and/or designed) arrangements that are conducive to agonistic, learning 
and robust outcomes’ (2003, pp. 425-7). There are a number of important institutional 
issues: how is the knowledge to be generated; what are the roles of the planner and 
researcher; how is testing to be handled? These governance concerns are summarised 
in Table 2, where the seven varieties of knowledge are collapsed into four types: 
empirical, process, predictive and normative. The three planning policy examples of 
Table 1 are again used as illustrations in the discussion below. 
  Taking empirical knowledge claims first, the above discussion has highlighted 
that such knowledge can come in lay as well as expert forms. Hence the term 
experiential knowledge may also be appropriate. As the knowledge will be based in 
lay and/or expert engagement with material circumstances, a variety of research 
methods will be appropriate and these will also find expression in a variety of ways. A 
community report on the experience of living in a village will be different to an expert 
assessment of the quality of life or natural capital in that village. The planner will 
have to respond to this by taking a number of roles. In commissioning evidence of 
these empirical states, there is a tendency to a consultancy model with the planner 
acting as client. Or the planner may take the role of amassing and analysing data. Or 
s/he will be facilitating the participation of local communities in making their 
knowledge explicit and presenting it in an appropriate form. The planner also plays a 
key role in handling differences between knowledges, particularly lay and expert 
positions. This requires forums for engaging expert with expert, lay perspective with 
lay perspective and lay and expert perspectives in examination of each other’s claims. 
Again the planner may need to support less powerful lay contributors. Any forum also 
requires procedures for resolution of these multiple claims to establish a relatively 
uncontested basis for planning action and evaluating that action.   19 
  Turning to process knowledge, this involves theoretically framed investigation 
of processes, both processes internal to planning organisations and those in the socio-
economic domain. It also involves research on the processes whereby planning 
engages with those socio-economic processes. This emphasis on processes involving 
planning practice suggests that in some cases a form of action research may be 
appropriate, alongside more traditional forms of research. This puts the planner in a 
very different position in terms of generating knowledge. Their experiential 
knowledge makes them the object of research but, in the case of action research, they 
are participants in the research. Lay input may still be relevant and a further role for 
the planner will be to judge how this input is to be facilitated and managed. Testing 
process knowledge claims requires the engagement of different causal models. This 
may take place in the academy but evaluations of policy and practice may also offer 
such opportunities. Eventually the planner needs to decide if the causal model is 
sufficiently robust for decision-making purposes.   
  In the case of predictive knowledge, there are similarities with process and 
empirical knowledge. What is involved here is theoretically framed investigation of 
future trends. This tends to be expert-led since lay knowledge tends to be based in 
current and past experience rather than suited to arguing about future trends. There 
may, however, be lay evidence that can support investigation of future trends. The 
role of the planner tends towards a consultancy model in which the planner is the 
client of the researcher, but one alert to the potential contribution of lay experiences. 
Testing of knowledge claims is similar to that for process knowledge. In particular it 
requires appropriate fora for examining challenges to the causal models underpinning 
predictions; however, there will also be methodological dimensions with debate on 
techniques of prediction.    20 
  Finally, turning to normative knowledge of appropriate goals for planning, this 
requires grounding in the range of possibilities for the future. But normative 
knowledge remains predominantly normative in character and, as such, it must be 
based in debate in the public sphere where a range of voices can be heard. The 
academic community (including universities and think tanks, etc.) can play a role 
through thinking through alternative future scenarios and much politically engaged 
and normative academic work takes this form. Flyvbjerg has sought to raise the status 
of such research through his model of social scientific research as phronesis (1992). 
The role of planner is similar to that proposed within collaborative planning but with 
an emphasis on the informed nature of the debates that are being managed.  
For, while normative debate in general can be open and unbounded, this form of 
normative knowledge requires that the claim of a future scenario being possible is 
seen as warranted. It is also important that the planner prevents any possible futures 
being ruled out of consideration. Here planners are adding an ethical voice of their 
own, supporting the hope of theorists such as Sandercock that planning can be 
genuinely emancipatory.  
  The three planning examples used in Table 1 can illustrate this discussion.   For 
example, in the sustainable construction case there will be an emphasis on expert 
knowledge of construction practices across the knowledge categories but this needs to 
be informed by the experiential knowledge of building users and open to challenge 
from NGOs as to their environmental impact and possible green futures. In the 
housing market case, while the development industry is a key source of expertise, 
planners need to be alert to the way that the housing ‘problem’ is framed through their 
market-led expertise and incorporate voices that challenge this perspective and 
suggest alternative visions of how housing need might be met. Alternative academic   21 
voices may be a support in structuring such debates. Finally, in the landscape values 
case the planner will be faced with a mix of different assessments of those values, 
potentially including expert assessment of lay values and those arising from more 
deliberative processes. Lay knowledge on change in the physical landscape may also 
be relevant. The challenge will be to engage these different voices, recognising the 
values and the knowledge that they give expression to.  
  The typology of planning knowledges therefore supports a variety of types of 
research activity, a number of different roles for planners in relation to that research 
and the organisation of forums for handling the different types of testing associated 
with each type of knowledge. These forums are particularly important since without 
this challenging activity, knowledge claims lose their specific character as knowledge 
and run the risk of becoming subsumed into the other types of claims that planning 
has to contend with.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to bridge some of the debates between modernist planning 
theorists and contemporary postmodern planning theory by arguing for the specific 
contribution of knowledge within planning while still seeing knowledge as socially 
constructed, multiple and constituted in the form of claims, open to contestation and 
recognition. This opens the way to rethinking some of the claims of contemporary 
planning theory about multiple epistemologies, allowing for planning to hear multiple 
voices in the name of democratic participation and empowerment but also arguing for 
specific spaces within planning to test out multiple knowledge claims. Not all claims 
within planning can be recast as knowledge claims just to promote the status of the   22 
claim-maker. There is a need to assert the value of knowledge within planning 
alongside the value of hearing diverse stakeholders. The typology of different 
planning knowledges and the arguments for claims-testing spaces within planning are 
proposed as ways of overcoming the current divide in the attitude to planning 
knowledge between the modernists and postmodernists. 
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Table 1  A typology of planning knowledge claims: three examples 
 
Type of 
knowledge 
claim 
Promoting sustainable construction  Responding to the housing market  Preserving landscape values 
Current state  Current construction technology and 
associated environmental impacts 
Indicators of housing supply and demand 
including price, homelessness, population, 
etc. 
Assessment of appreciation of 
landscape by local residents and 
visitors 
Predicted state  Trends in technology and industry 
take-up and predicted environmental 
impacts 
Trends in demographics, housebuilding, 
prices, etc. including local scenarios 
Trends in cultural values, leisure 
activities and predicted landscape 
changes 
Societal 
processes 
Understanding R&D processes in 
construction and pressures towards 
sustainable development in the 
industry 
Understanding the dynamics in the 
housebuilding industry, the housing 
market and the allocation of housing to 
social groups 
Understanding the cultural and 
economic processes underpinning 
landscape values 
Planning 
processes 
Role of planning in agenda setting; 
how sustainable R&D can be 
embedded in planning decision-
making 
The influence of housing market indicators 
and other factors in planning decision 
making on releasing housing land  
The role of landscape values within 
the planning system; where they are 
expressed 
Outcomes state  Monitoring of changes in construction 
technology 
Monitoring housing market indicators in 
the locality 
Monitoring changes in the landscape 
and its appreciation 
Planning-
societal 
interactions 
Understanding of how planning 
influences construction patterns 
Understanding of how planning releases 
housing land and the impact on prices and 
meeting housing need in the locality 
Understanding how planning 
decisions influence local landscape 
features and knowledge of those 
features 
Normative 
knowledge 
Vision of potential Sustainable 
Construction developments 
Vision of how housing need should be met  Vision of the desired local landscape 
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Table 2  Testing and recognising knowledge claims in planning 
 
Type of 
Knowledge 
Empirical  Process  Predictive  Normative 
Research 
Method 
Variety of lay and expert modes 
of engagement with material 
circumstances 
Theoretically framed process 
research; action research 
Theoretically framed 
expert research on the 
future informed by 
experiential knowledge 
where appropriate 
Informed debate in 
the public sphere; 
phronetic research 
Relation of 
planner to 
research 
Mix of data analyst, 
consultancy client and advocate 
for lay perspectives 
Object and/or participant in research  Consultancy client  Mediator; ethical 
voice; informed voice 
Arena for 
testing claims  
Forums for examining claims 
and counter-claims and 
resolving them; lay actors may 
make and challenge claims with 
planner support 
Testing involves debate between 
causal models in academic and policy 
contexts with lay and practitioner 
input; planners judge the appropriate 
mix of inputs in policy contexts 
As with process 
knowledge but also 
covering predictive 
techniques 
Testing occurs in 
civil society through 
deliberative means 
with planner support 
Role of 
planner in 
recognising 
claims 
Planners draw account of 
current situation from debates 
Planners decide if causal model is 
sufficiently robust for planning 
decision-making 
As with process 
knowledge but also 
covering predictive 
techniques 
Planners ensure the 
possibility of 
alternative futures is 
considered 
 